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ABSTRACT	
	
This	study	measures	the	effect	of	competition	on	leverage	using	unbalanced	panel	data	from	4,957	US	
listed	 firms	within	 8	 industries.	To	 address	 the	 issues	 associated	 with	 concentration	 indexes,	we	
contribute	to	the	literature	by	using	a	new	measure	of	competition	–	the	Boone	indicator	which	is	based	
on	 efficiency.	Initially	 results	 indicate	 a	 positive	 (negative)	 effect	 of	 competition	 (concentration)	 on	
leverage.	Due	 to	 the	distorting	effect	 of	 the	recent	 financial	 crisis,	 the	 sample	was	 split	 into	 two	 sub-
periods.	 From	 this	 it	 was	 determined	 that	competition	 has	 a	significant	negative	 effect	 on	capital	
structure	when	measured	with	the	BI	which	is	a	theoretically	robust	proxy	for	competition.	Accounting	
for	non-linearity	does	not	produce	any	significant	results.		
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1.	INTRODUCTION	
	
The	theory	of	capital	structure	gained	global	attention	with	the	introduction	of	the	Modigliani	and	
Miller	model	 (Modigliani	&	Miller,	 1958,	 1963)	which	 states	 that	 firm	 value	 and	 capital	 structure	 are	
independent	of	one	another	in	a	perfect	capital	market.	Under	this	assumption	firms	cannot	strengthen	
their	competitive	position	via	strategically	determining	leverage.	This	implication	that	debt	and	equity	are	
equal	alternatives	for	one	another	formed	the	basis	of	modern	thinking	on	capital	structure	and	has	led	
to	alternative	theories	in	which	the	irrelevance	of	capital	structure	is	rejected	when	the	assumption	of	
perfect	capital	markets	is	relaxed	(Pandey,	2002).	Although	it	has	been	a	significant	subject	for	financial	
economists,	 there	 is	still	no	definitive	overarching	explanation	of	corporate	debt	policy.	The	prevalent	
alternative	explanations	include:	predation	models	(Bolton	&	Scharfstein,	1990),	limited	liability	models	
(Brander	&	 Lewis,	 1986)	 and	 investment	effect	models	 (Myers,	 1977)	which	will	 be	explored	 in	detail	
below.		
This	 paper	 analyzes	 the	 interaction	 between	 capital	 structure	 and	 product	 market	 behavior	
(competition)	 by	 empirically	 modelling	 the	 determinants	 of	 leverage.	 We	 use	 a	 new	 measure	 of	
competition:	the	Boone	(Boone,	Griffith	&	Harrison,	2005)	Indicator	(BI).	To	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	
this	has	not	been	used	as	a	measure	of	competition	for	US	listed	firms.	Given	that	traditional	theory	has	
been	challenged	and	studies	recognize	that	financial	leverage	has	an	impact	on	product	market	behavior,	
it	is	important	to	correctly	identify	the	nature	of	this	relationship.	This	is	of	practical	significance	because	
a	firm	can	strategically	alter	a	rival’s	behavior.	The	Boone	Indicator	is	a	relatively	new	proxy	that	resolves	
several	problems	that	are	often	encountered	in	studies	focusing	on	capital	structure	and	product	market	
competition.	So,	our	efforts	will	provide	results	that	utilize	a	more	accurate	indicator	of	competition.	
There	are	various	studies	that	explore	the	 link	between	capital	structure	and	market	structure	
such	 as	 Titman	 (1984),	 Brander	 &	 Lewis	 (1986),	Maksimovic	 (1988),	 Bolton	&	 Scharfstein	 (1990)	 and	
Showalter	 (1999).	The	results	 indicate	that	by	varying	debt	 in	a	strategic	way,	a	 firm	can	shift	a	rival’s	
strategy	in	a	way	that	benefits	the	firm,	thus	enhancing	their	product	market	position.	At	a	certain	point	
the	benefits	of	strategic	debt	equal	the	costs	associated	with	an	increase	in	leverage,	and	an	equilibrium	
is	reached.	The	theory	is	consistent	in	that	firms	select	capital	structure	based	on	these	various	costs	and	
benefits	of	debt	and	equity	respectively.	 	
A	theory	of	predation	is	presented	by	Bolton	&	Scharfstein	(1990)	which	is	similar	to	the	long-
purse	theory.	The	idea	is	that	higher	levels	of	debt	help	mitigate	managerial	agency	problems	however,	
the	optimal	 debt	 ratio	 to	 achieve	 this	 inadvertently	maximizes	 a	 rival’s	 opportunity	 to	prey.	A	highly-
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levered	 firm	 is	 susceptible	 to	 predatory	 action	 by	 a	 firm	with	 lower	 leverage	 or	 “deep	 pockets,”	 for	
example,	a	firm	may	drop	prices	(Bertrand	competition)	or	increase	output	(Cournot	competition)	in	order	
to	drive	rivals	out	of	the	market.	Therefore,	there	is	a	trade-off	between	mitigating	incentive	problems	
and	 dissuading	 predation	 by	 competitors.	 Based	 on	 the	 predation	 model	 the	 relationship	 between	
leverage	and	competitive	position	is	negative.	
Choice	of	financial	structure	can	affect	output	markets	and	future	competitive	position	in	what	
Brander	and	Lewis	(1986)	refer	to	as	the	‘limited	liability	effect	of	debt	financing.’	Essentially,	changes	in	
the	debt	ratio	affect	the	distribution	of	returns	between	debt	and	equity	holders	which	alters	the	strategy	
favored	by	equity	holders.	Since	creditors	have	preference	when	a	firm	is	in	receivership,	equity	holders	
are	only	concerned	about	returns	during	periods	of	profitability	and	when	leverage	increases	shareholders	
are	motivated	to	adopt	riskier	output	strategies	(Mitani,	2014).	Consequently,	when	a	firm	increases	debt	
it	 is	signaling	a	more	aggressive	future	strategy.	The	relationship	described	here	demonstrates	a	firm’s	
anticipation	of	the	effect	of	their	capital	structure	on	output	markets,	as	such,	product	market	conditions	
shape	financing	decisions.	In	contrast	to	the	predation	model,	limited	liability	effect	incentivizes	firms	to	
increase	debt	levels.	
	 The	asset	substitution	effect	describes	a	situation	in	which	a	firm	exchanges	low-risk	assets	for	
high-risk	assets,	thus	shifting	value	from	debt-holders	to	shareholders.	In	the	investment	effect	models,	
debt	causes	underinvestment	due	to	the	agency	problem	/	asset	substitution	effect	where	a	firm	will	not	
invest	in	low-risk	assets	(Kovenock	&	Phillips,	1997;	Myers,	1984,	1977).	Due	to	asymmetric	information,	
the	pecking	order	hypothesis	was	developed	which	states	 that	 internal	 financing	 is	cheaper	than	both	
debt	 and	 equity	 financing.	 These	models	 also	 support	 a	 negative	 relationship	 between	 leverage	 and	
competition.	
	 The	empirical	papers	often	present	ambiguous	or	inconsistent	results	regarding	the	nature	of	the	
relationship	between	capital	structure	and	a	firm's	market	share	which	demonstrates	the	need	for	further	
investigation.	Some	results	indicate	a	positive	relationship	between	debt	and	market	structure	and	others	
support	a	negative	relationship,	however,	older	studies	consistently	predict	a	linear	relationship.	Pandey	
(2002)	was	the	first	to	suggest	that	the	relationship	between	capital	structure	and	market	power	may	be	
nonlinear.	His	research	was	based	on	data	from	Malaysian	firms	using	Tobin’s	Q	as	a	proxy	for	market	
power.	Guney,	Li	&	Fairchild	(2011)	build	on	this	research	also	suggesting	a	nonlinear	relationship	between	
capital	structure	and	product	market	competition	in	Chinese	listed	firms	using	Tobin’s	Q.	Consequently,	
we	will	also	test	for	both	a	linear	and	nonlinear	relationship	in	the	US.		
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	 Studies	on	this	topic	typically	measure	market	structure	using	one	of	the	following:	Tobin’s	Q,	the	
Herfindahl-Hirschman	index	(HHI)	or	the	Lerner	index	(LI).	We	employ	the	Boone	indicator	(BI)	(Boone,	
Griffith	&	Harrison,	2005)	to	address	some	of	the	issues	associated	with	the	concentration	indexes	found	
in	previous	studies.		For	example,	we	do	not	know	what	causes	a	high	level	of	market	concentration;	it	
could	be	that	inefficient	firms	exit	as	competition	intensifies	(Fosu,	2013).	In	this	case,	concentration	isn’t	
necessarily	the	best	predictor	of	the	degree	of	competition.	Alternatively,	the	BI	measures	how	sensitive	
a	firm's	market	share	is	compared	to	their	inefficiency	in	the	market	(Boone,	Griffith	&	Harrison,	2005).	
This	is	derived	from	the	expectation	that	firms	will	be	more	acutely	penalized	through	loss	of	market	share	
for	 being	 inefficient	 when	 it's	 a	 more	 competitive	 product	 market.	 Hence,	 the	 BI	 is	 not	 affected	 by	
restructuring	within	product	markets	as	the	alternative	indexes	are.	In	addition	to	the	BI,	we	will	use	the	
Herfindahl-Hirschman	index	which	is	based	on	concentration	to	examine	the	consistency	of	the	results.	
We	hope	that	by	using	a	new	measure	of	competition	we	can	contribute	to	the	literature	and	shed	some	
light	on	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	capital	structure	and	competition.	
	 The	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	Chapter	2	reviews	the	existing	literature	and	covers	key	works	
on	 capital	 structure	 and	 market	 structure.	 Guided	 by	 the	 preceding	 review,	 Chapter	 3	 presents	 the	
conceptual	framework	and	more	specifically,	the	hypotheses	regarding	the	effect	of	market	competition	
on	capital	structure.	Chapter	4	outlines	the	methodology	and	a	description	of	the	data	which	is	followed	
by	the	results	and	discussion	of	the	statistical	analysis	in	Chapter	5.	The	paper	concludes	with	a	summary.		
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2.	LITERATURE	REVIEW	
	
This	chapter	analyzes	 the	previous	empirical	 studies	on	 firm	capital	 structure	relative	 to	 their	
market	share	as	well	as	the	theoretical	literature	on	agency	costs,	asset	substitution,	bankruptcy	
and	tax	shield.	This	is	then	linked	backed	to	competition	and	the	implications	on	our	research	
and	how	we	developed	our	model.	It	forms	the	basis	of	understanding	on	the	topic	and	leads	to	
our	conceptual	framework.		
	
2.1	Background	
	 Though	many	studies	analyze	the	relationship	between	capital	structure	and	market	structure,	
different	conclusions	are	often	made	due	to	the	utilization	of	different	competition	variables	as	well	as	
the	level	of	development	of	the	studied	country.	For	example,	as	a	developed	country,	capital	structure	
in	the	United	States	is	often	defined	using	long	term	debt	and	more	developing	countries	use	short	term	
debt	(Rajan	&	Zingales	1995).	Pandey	(2002)	demonstrates	how	the	tax	shield,	different	agency	costs	and	
financial	distresses	lead	to	a	non-linear	relationship	between	capital	structure	and	market	structure.	Using	
the	Lerner	 index,	Krishnaswamy,	Mangla	and	Rathinasamy	(1992)	 find	a	positive	relationship	between	
debt	and	market	structure.	As	such,	we	will	also	use	a	concentration	 index	to	determine	whether	our	
results	 are	 consistent	 with	 previous	 studies.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Chevalier	 (1993)	 finds	 a	 negative	
relationship	straying	from	pecking	order	and	asymmetric	information	theories.	
2.2	Agency	Costs	
In	order	to	maximize	profits	for	the	benefit	of	shareholders,	the	agency	costs	theory	suggests	high	
levels	 of	 borrowing	 (Pandey,	 2002).	 Problems	 are	 evident	 within	 agency	 relationships 1 	due	 to	 the	
information	asymmetries.	Jensen	and	Meckling	(1976)	analyze	the	two	variations	of	agency	costs.	One	
type	of	agency	cost	comes	into	effect	from	the	shareholder-manager	conflict	which	causes	agency	costs	
of	managerial	discretion;	when	there	is	an	information	advantage	for	one	party,	moral	hazard	is	created2.	
To	protect	against	this,	firms	must	monitor	management	which	translates	to	more	firm	costs.	Aggarwal	&	
Kyaw	(Aggarwal	&	Kyaw,	2010)	suggest	that	the	shareholder-manager	problem	fails	to	acknowledge	that	
                                                
1	We	define	an	agency	relationship	as	one	where	a	person	/	party	appoints	an	‘agent’	to	perform	duties	on	their	
behalf	and	consequently	shift	decision	making	power	to	the	agent.		
2	A	moral	hazard	occurs	when	one	party	has	an	information	advantage,	and	uses	this	at	the	expense	of	the	lesser	
informer	party.		
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the	agency	costs	of	managerial	discretion	take	place	between	firms	in	imperfectly	competitive	markets.	A	
firm	will	place	positive	weight	on	their	own	performance	and	alternatively,	negative	weight	on	industry	
performance.	The	negative	 sensitivity	 to	 industry	performance	 suggests	 that	 the	manager	will	 receive	
higher	compensation	if	they	provide	higher	returns	relative	to	the	industry.	This	creates	an	incentive	to	
lower	the	industry	returns.	Jensen	and	Meckling	(1976)	suggest	that	by	increasing	leverage,	this	type	of	
agency	cost	can	be	avoided	and	firm	performance	can	be	improve.	The	second	type	of	agency	cost	that	
they	identify	is	the	shareholder-creditor	conflict,	or	rather,	the	agency	costs	of	debt.	While	shareholders	
will	prefer	higher	leverage	and	higher	payouts,	debt-holders	will	prefer	lower	leverage	and	lower	payouts.	
Consequently,	the	agency	cost	theory	predicts	a	positive	relationship	between	leverage	and	competition.	
Brander	and	Lewis	(1986)	provide	a	link	to	the	firm	financing	of	an	investment.	While	debt	holders	
are	 given	 priority	 over	 firm	 income,	 stockholders	 can	 only	 claim	 residual	 earnings.	 Consequently,	
investment	behavior,	given	a	high	 level	of	debt,	 incentivizes	strategies	producing	high	returns	 in	good	
times	and	lower	returns	in	bad	times.	This	assumption	that	firms	want	to	maximize	shareholder	wealth	is	
also	seen	in	Maksimovic	(1988).	Their	paper	also	argues	to	increase	leverage	in	order	to	reduce	agency	
costs.		
	
2.3	Asset	Substitution		 	
Shareholders	often	take	on	high	levels	of	debt	in	order	to	finance	risky	projects.	If	the	investment	
is	profitable,	both	lenders	and	shareholders	are	compensated;	however,	if	the	project	fails,	only	the	lender	
incurs	the	loss.	Jensen	and	Meckling	(1976)	identify	asset	substitution,	the	transfer	of	wealth	from	debt	
to	equity	holders	through	the	substitution	of	riskier	assets,	in	order	to	increase	the	value	of	equity.	This	
often	 takes	place	as	 it	 is	both	costly	and	difficult	 for	 the	debt	holders	 to	assess	and	monitor	 the	 risky	
projects.	Myers	(1977)	uses	asset	substitution	to	model	the	determinants	of	corporate	borrowing;	a	model	
that	demonstrates	under-investment	is	caused	by	debt.		
	 The	premise	of	 the	pecking	order	hypothesis	 is	 that	 financing	 comes	 from	3	 sources:	 internal	
financing,	debt	and	the	issuance	of	new	equity	with	the	latter	resulting	in	the	most	deadweight	cost	of	
information	 asymmetry	 (Myers,	 1984).	 This	 theory	 is	 important	 further	 on	 in	 the	 study	when	we	 are	
modelling	leverage	and	predicting	the	effect	that	certain	variables	in	the	empirical	formula	will	have	on	
leverage.	For	example,	we	would	expect	 that	a	 firm	with	high	profitability	will	have	access	 to	 internal	
financing	 and	 as	 such	 the	 pecking	 order	 hypothesis	 would	 predict	 a	 negative	 relationship	 between	
leverage	and	profitability.	We	will	explore	these	relationships	further	in	the	methodology	section.	
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	Stulz	(1990)	demonstrates	how	efforts	to	alleviate	overinvestment	problems	can	in	turn	result	in	
underinvestment	due	to	managers’	resource	constraints	from	the	shift	of	cash	flow	to	debtholders.		 In	
summary,	 theories	 guided	 by	 asset	 substitution	and	 the	 pecking	 order	 hypothesis	 predict	 a	 negative	
relationship	between	capital	structure	and	market	structure.		
	
2.4	Bankruptcy	
Bankruptcy	costs	have	been	used	to	explain	how	a	firm	determines	its	capital	structure.	A	firm	
with	a	higher	probability	of	bankruptcy	will	combat	the	problem	with	a	lower	debt	ratio.	Though	a	firm	
with	more	 available	 equity	 is	 less	 prone	 to	 bankruptcy,	 firms	 with	 deep	 pockets	 have	 a	 competitive	
advantage	(Brander	&	Lewis	1986).	This	is	based	on	the	long	purse	hypothesis	where	a	firm	chooses	low	
leverage	as	a	competitive	strategy	to	push	more	highly	levered	firms	out	of	its	industry.	In	Titman	(1984)	
it	is	shown	that	capital	structure	can	instigate	liquidation	by	shareholders	when	a	firm	is	not	bankrupt.	
Additionally,	capital	structure	is	a	mechanism	through	which	a	firm	can	predispose	itself	to	a	particular	
liquidation	policy	which	it	deems	optimal.	By	using	capital	structure	to	determine	the	future	liquidation	
policy,	the	current	terms	of	trade	with	customers,	employees	and	suppliers	are	affected.	Subsequently,	
an	 increase	 in	 debt	 is	 associated	 with	 an	 increase	 in	 risk	 of	 bankruptcy	 which	 adversely	 affects	 the	
aforementioned	terms	of	trade	with	stakeholders.		
Bankruptcy	is	a	cost	of	debt	financing	that	is	pertinent	when	management	are	determining	the	
debt	ratio.	Ideally,	we	would	have	liked	to	include	bankruptcy	costs	in	our	model	of	leverage,	but	following	
the	works	of	Negash	(2001),	this	in	itself	is	a	separate	topic	for	investigation	and	a	limitation	of	our	study.			
	
2.5	Tax	Shield	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mogliani	and	Miller	(1963)	justify	a	high	debt	level	through	the	tax	shield	theory.	Here,	they	argue	
that	 profitable	 firms	 borrow	more	 in	 order	 to	 utilize	 the	 tax	 shelter.	 Deductions	 from	 interest	 costs	
maximize	output	which	ultimately	increases	profitability.		A	positive	relationship	between	profitability	and	
market	structure	as	well	as	between	capital	structure	and	market	structure	is	concluded.	DeAngelo	and	
Masulis	(1980)	model	optimal	capital	structure	through	the	incorporation	of	taxes:	corporate,	personal	
and	non-debt	related	tax	shields.	The	model	defends	the	argument	that	these	tax	credits	and	deductions	
are	substitutes	to	the	benefits	of	debt	financing.	So,	less	debt	is	seen	in	firm	capital	structure	for	firms	
with	a	higher	non-debt	tax	shield	relative	to	its	expected	cash	flow.	This	paper	comes	to	the	conclusion	
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that	every	firm	will	have	a	unique	level	of	optimal	capital	structure.	We	will	include	the	tax	shield	in	our	
model	of	capital	structure	and	we	predict	a	positive	relationship	to	exist.		
	
2.6	Leverage-Competition		
Zingales	 (1998)	 addresses	 causality	 and	 how	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 structural	model	 prohibits	 us	 from	
determining	whether	product	market	competition	affects	capital	structure	or	if	a	firm’s	capital	structure	
affects	its	standing	against	its	competition	The	works	of	Brander	&	Lewis	(1986),	Maksimovic	(1988),	and	
Bolton	&	Scharfstein	(1990)	demonstrate	how	firms	decide	on	their	capital	structure	before	engaging	in	
product	 market	 competition.	 Given	 a	 level	 of	 debt,	 managers	 have	 to	 commit	 to	 their	 competitive	
strategy.	We	explore	this	potential	reverse	causality	further	on	in	the	study.				
	
2.7	Practical	Implications	
We	have	found	an	extensive	array	of	literature	which	we	have	categorically	organized	into:	agency	
costs,	asset	substitution,	bankruptcy,	the	tax	shield,	and	competition	and	we	have	discussed	the	effect	
each	 of	 these	 has	 on	 our	 model	 of	 capital	 structure.	 These	 are	 broad	 theories	 and	 should	 not	 be	
considered	in	isolation.	Although	there	are	strategic	approaches	taken	by	firms	to	optimize	the	tradeoff	
between	debt	and	equity,	the	literature	does	not	propose	an	operational	formula	that	can	measure	this	
relationship	(Negash,	2001).	There	are	reasons	for	using	debt	that	are	hard	to	quantify	for	example,	it	can	
be	 a	 takeover	 defense	 (Israel,	 1991)	 or	 a	 barrier	 to	 entry	 (Fulghieri	 &	 Nagarajan,	 1996).	 Due	 to	
measurement	difficulties	these	benefits,	among	others,	are	endogenous	 in	the	model	and	make	this	a	
difficult	topic	to	investigate.	In	the	following	section	we	outline	our	hypothesis	then	begin	developing	our	
model.		
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3.	CONCEPTUAL	FRAMEWORK	
	
In	the	previous	chapter,	we	systematically	reviewed	the	literature.	We	found	conflicting	evidence	
which	we	use	to	narrow	down	our	hypotheses.	We	provide	a	brief	explanation	of	the	implications	
of	results	of	the	hypotheses.	
	
3.1	Hypotheses	
	 Studies	have	affirmed	that	there	is	a	significant	difference	in	leverage	between	industries	in	US	
listed	firms	(Guney,	Li	&	Fairchild,	2011).	Given	the	assumption	that	there	is	also	a	significant	difference	
in	product	market	competition	between	industries	in	US	listed	firms	we	are	testing	the	following:	
	
Hypothesis	 1:	 There	 is	 a	 significant	 relationship	 between	 leverage	 and	 product	 market	
competition	across	US	listed	firms.				
	
As	 outlined	 in	 the	 introduction,	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 leverage	 and	 product	market	
competition	 indicates	 the	presence	of	 limited	 liability	effects	and	a	negative	 relationship	 indicates	 the	
presence	 of	 predation	 and	 asset	 substitution	 effects.	 Because	 there	 are	 more	 theories	 suggesting	 a	
negative	relationship,	we	test	the	following:	
	
Hypothesis	2:	There	is	a	negative	relationship	between	leverage	and	product	market	competition	
across	US	listed	firm.			
	
Further,	 we	will	 also	 explore	 a	 non-linear	 relationship	 between	 leverage	 and	 product	market	
competition	which	is	indicative	of	a	combination	of	limited	liability	effects	and	predation	effects	(Fairchild,	
2004).	All	the	previous	research	on	US	firms	suggests	a	linear	relationship	(Chevalier,	1993;	Krishnaswamy,	
Mangla	 &	 Rathinasamy,	 1992;	 Phillips,	 1995).	 There	 are	 some	 recent	 studies	 suggesting	 a	 non-linear	
relationship	albeit	based	on	studies	in	the	Asia-Pacific	region	(Guney,	Li	&	Fairchild,	2011;	Pandey,	2002).	
We	wish	to	verify	whether	the	previous	US	literature	is	still	accurate:	
	
Hypothesis	3:	There	 is	a	 linear	relationship	between	leverage	and	product	market	competition	
across	US	listed	firms.		
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4.	DATA	AND	METHODOLOGY	
	
In	the	previous	chapters	the	literature	was	reviewed	and	conceptual	framework	outlined,	from	
which	our	hypotheses	were	derived.	In	order	to	test	the	relationships	described,	data	on	US	listed	
firms	has	been	obtained	and	our	method	to	quantify	the	leverage-competition	effects	is	outlined	
below.		
	
4.1	Data	and	Empirical	Model	
This	study	uses	unbalanced	panel	data	for	firms	listed	on	the	New	York	Stock	Exchange	between	
2006	and	2016	obtained	from	Compustat	North	America.	The	last	ten	years	are	used	in	order	to	analyze	
the	most	recent	trends	between	capital	structure	and	product	market	behavior.	To	manage	a	reasonable	
amount	of	observations,	for	practical	matters,	yearly	observations	are	used.		The	data	is	broken	down	into	
individual	 industries	 based	 on	 the	 Standard	 Industrial	 Classification	 (SIC)	 code:	 agriculture,	 mining,	
construction,	 manufacturing,	 transportation,	 wholesale	 trade,	 retail	 trade	 and	 services.	 Financial	 and	
other	 securities	 industries	 were	 excluded	 as	 they	 are	 seen	 to	 use	 leverage	 differently	 than	 other	
industries.	By	utilizing	the	four-digit	SIC	codes	we	assume	that	there	is	a	“one-to-one	correspondence.”	
As	Aggarwal	(1999)	points	out,	this	is	not	always	so	as	certain	industries	may	include	a	mismeasurement	
due	to	aggregation,	however,	 it	 is	unlikely	to	bias	our	empirical	results.	The	study	excludes	companies	
with	missing	data,	no	sales,	or	negative	equity;	we	are	left	with	a	sample	38,767	observations	and	4,957	
firms.	
	
Table	1:	Panel	Data	Information	
	
Industry	
Industry	
Code	 Number	of	Observations	 Number	of	Firms	
Agriculture	 A	 199	 26	
Mining	 Mi	 2492	 396	
Construction	 Co	 472	 60	
Manufacturing	 Ma	 17378	 2212	
Transportation	 T	 6264	 709	
Wholesale	Trade	 W	 1494	 181	
Retail	Trade	 R	 2569	 301	
Services	 S	 7899	 1072	
	 	 38767	 4957	
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	 In	our	model,	the	dependent	variable	is	leverage	and	is	defined	by	total	debt	over	total	assets.	
The	 independent	 variables	were	 selected	 based	 on	 the	 literature	 as	 listed	 in	 section	 4.1	 and	 include:	
profitability,	size,	growth,	tangibility,	uniqueness	of	assets	and	non-debt	tax	shield.	We	estimate	capital	
structure	as	follows:	
𝑙𝑒𝑣$% = 𝛼 + 𝜆% + 	𝜇$ + 	𝛽-𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓$% + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒$% + 𝛽6𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ$% + 𝛽;𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔$% + 𝛽>𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆$% + 𝛽C𝑈𝑂𝐴$% + 𝛽G𝑋I%+ 𝛽J𝑋I%2 + 𝛽K𝑋I%6 + 𝜀$%																																																																																																																		(1)	
where	i	denotes	each	individual	firm,	t	denotes	years,	j	denotes	each	industry,	a	denotes	the	intercept,	𝜆%	is	a	 time	dummy	variable	that	controls	 for	macroeconomic	events,	𝜇$ 	is	 the	 fixed	effect	 for	 firms,	b	
denotes	 the	estimated	coefficients	 for	 the	explanatory	variables,	X	denotes	 the	competition	variable	 -	
linear,	parabolic	 (X,	X2)	or	cubic	 (X,	X2,	X3)	 relationships	are	considered	between	 leverage	and	product	
market	competition	and	finally	𝜀$%	is	the	error	term.		 	
As	a	measure	of	competition,	the	Boone	Indicator	and	the	Herfindahl-Hirschman	Index	are	used.	
Tobin’s	 Q	 was	 considered	 as	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 many	 other	 empirical	 papers	 however,	 it	 is	 a	 more	
appropriate	measure	of	future	growth	opportunities	rather	than	competition	(Demsetz	&	Lehn,	1985).		
	
4.2	Competition	Variables			
4.2.1	The	Boone	Indicator	(BI)	
The	 Boone	 Indicator	 introduces	 a	 new	 way	 to	 measure	 competition	 that	 encompasses	 the	
intuition	that	firms	in	a	competitive	market	are	punished	for	inefficiency.	BI	measures	competition	amidst	
firms	based	on	relative	profit.	The	elasticity	for	an	industry	is	estimated	by	profit	over	marginal	costs	or	
rather	the	increase	in	profits	due	to	a	1%	increase	in	efficiency	(Boone,	Griffith	&	Harrison,	2004).	Given	
that	a	competitive	market	will	punish	firms	intensely	for	being	inefficient,	an	increase	in	marginal	costs	
will	have	a	more	detrimental	effect	on	variable	profit.		
A	simple	model	is	used	to	theoretically	explain	why	the	price-cost	margin	is	not	a	robust	measure	
of	industry	competition.	Boone	(2005)	establishes	the	theory	by	first	creating	a	model	that	looks	at	the	
demand	curve	for	firm	i:		 𝑝 𝑥$, 𝑥R$ = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑥$ − 𝑑 𝑥IIV$ 	
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where		
a:	a	measure	of	the	size	of	the	market	
b:	a	measure	of	the	market	elasticity	of	demand	
ci:	constant	marginal	costs	
d:		a	measure	of	consumer’s	differentiation	in	products	in	a	market	as	close	substitutes	
n:	number	of	firms	
	
	 Firm	i	will	choose	output	xi	for:		maxZ[\ {(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑥 − 𝑑 𝑥IIV$ )𝑥 − 𝑐$𝑥}	
	 The	Cournot	output	for	firm	I:		
𝑥 𝑐$, 𝑐R$, 𝑛 = 2𝑏𝑑 − 1 𝑎 − 2𝑏𝑑 + 𝑛 − 1 𝑐$ + 𝑐IaIb-(2𝑏 + 𝑑 𝑛 − 1 )(2𝑏𝑑 − 1) 	
	 	 	 where:	
	 	 	 	 ci	are	average	variable	costs	defined	by	
cde$dfgh	ijk%klehchamh	l 	
	 	 and	profits	are	defined	by:		𝜋$ = 𝑏 + 𝜆𝑑 𝑥 𝑐$, 𝑐R$, 𝑛 2	
where	firm	i	enters	if	𝜋$ ≥ 𝑓	
By	reducing	entry	barriers	(f),	competition	can	be	increased	and	the	firm	takes	on	a	more	
aggressive	stance.		
	 	 (Boone,	Griffith	&	Harrison,	2004)	
	
Based	on	Fosu	(2013),	firm	elasticity	(the	Boone	Indicator)	is	estimated	by	𝛽	given:	
p$% = 𝛼 + 𝛽%ln	(𝐶$I) + 𝜀$%	
Where	p	is	profit,	measured	as	sales	revenue	less	cost	of	goods	sold	(COGS)	divided	by	total	assets.	
ln(C)	is	the	natural	log	of	marginal	costs	measured	by	COGS	divided	by	sales	revenue.	The	firm	is	i	and	the	
industry	 is	 j.	 The	 absolute	 value	 of	𝛽 	measures	 competition,	 therefore	 a	 higher	 absolute	 value	 of	 the	
coefficients	 indicates	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 industry	 competition.	 We	 separated	 the	 data	 into	 the	 eight	
industries	and	ran	a	regression	for	each	year	in	our	sample	period	resulting	in	80	estimates	of	competition.	
The	average	of	these	for	each	industry	can	be	seen	in	Table	4.		
      (2) 
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In	the	results	for	the	Boone	Indicator	we	expect	to	either	find	that	high	efficiency	firms	compete	
more	 fiercely	 or	 that	 high	 levels	 of	 competition	 push	 out	 inefficient	 firms	 and	 increases	 productivity	
(Boone,	Griffith	&	Harrison,	2004).	
4.2.2	Herfindahl-Hirschman	Index	(HHI)		
Since	the	vast	majority	of	previous	empirical	studies	use	a	concentration	index,	HHI	is	utilized	to	
see	if	we	get	consistent	results.	HHI	is	a	proxy	for	the	level	of	market	concentration	(which	is	said	to	be	
the	inverse	of	competition)	for	a	given	industry.	The	higher	the	HHI,	the	higher	the	level	of	concentration	
in	an	industry	and	in	turn,	the	industry	consists	of	a	less	competitive	market.		
Given	that	HHI	is	based	on	the	Cournot	model,	an	increase	in	competition	is	seen	to	raise	the	HHI.		
Following	the	method	utilized	in	Guney,	Li	&	Fairchild	(2011),	HHI	is	defined	as:	
𝐻𝐻𝐼I% = ( 𝑥$I%𝑥$I%aI$b- )2
uI
$b- 	
Where	HHIj	is	the	index	for	industry	j	at	time	t.	Xi	denotes	the	sales	conducted	by	firm	i.	As	with	
the	BI,	there	is	one	measure	of	competition	per	year	within	each	industry	and	the	average	value	can	be	
found	in	Table	4.		
	
4.3	Independent	Variables	
Amongst	the	various	empirical	studies	on	capital	structure,	the	determinants	are	seen	to	vary	by	
country	given	the	level	of	economic	development.	Rajan	and	Zingales	(1995)	compare	the	capital	structure	
of	firms	in	the	United	States	to	the	capital	structure	seen	in	various	countries	and	find	firm	leverage	to	be	
quite	similar	across	the	G-7	countries.	
Table	2:	Definition	of	Variables	 	 	
Variables:	 Abbreviation		 Definition	
Dependent	Variable	 	 	
Leverage	 lev	 Debt/Total	Assets	
	 	 	
Independent	Variables	 	 	
Profitability	 prof	 Operating	Profit/	Total	Assets	
Size	 size	 ln(Total	Assets)	
Growth	 growth	 Salest-Salest-1/Salest-1	
Tangibility	 tang	 PP&E/Total	Assets	
Uniqueness	of	Assets	 UOA	 Operating	Expenses/Total	Sales	
Non-debt	tax	shield	 NDTS	 Depreciation/Total	Assets	
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4.3.1	Profitability	
Profitability	(prof)	heavily	influences	capital	structure	and	can	be	defined	through	the	return	on	
assets.	This	is	calculated	as	operating	profit	over	total	assets.	The	more	profitable	a	firm	is	the	more	the	
firm	can	shield	itself	from	taxes	and	therefore	can	take	on	more	debt.		However,	pecking	order	theory	
predicts	a	negative	relationship	between	profitability	and	leverage	as	described	in	section	2.2.	As	such,	
the	relationship	is	unclear.		
	
4.3.2	Size	
Firm	size	 (size)	 is	defined	as	 the	natural	 log	of	 total	assets.	Many	studies,	 including	Rajan	and	
Zingales	(1995),	show	both	a	significant	and	positive	relationship	between	the	size	of	a	firm	and	its	debt	
ratio.		
	
4.3.3	Growth	
Sales	growth	(growth)	is	calculated	as	the	difference	between	the	sales	of	firm	i	at	time	t	less	a	
one	period	lag	divided	by	the	said	lag.	This	variable	is	indicative	of	expectations	of	future	profit	and	will	
provide	 flexibility	 for	 future	 investments	 creating	 a	 positive	 correlation	 between	 the	 debt	 ratio	 and	
growth.		
	
4.3.4	Tangibility	
Tangibility	(tang)	is	calculated	as	the	ratio	of	plant,	property	&	equipment	over	total	assets	and	
has	a	significant	impact	on	a	firm’s	borrowing	capacity	(Booth,	Aivazian	&	Demirguc-kunt,	2001;	Campello,	
2003).	Jensen	&	Meckling	(1976)	demonstrate	how	tangible	assets	provide	lenders	security	 in	times	of	
financial	distress	by	acting	as	collateral;	this	is	supported	by	the	trade-off	hypothesis.	The	shareholder-
lender	conflict	holds	its	share	of	moral	hazard	whereby	the	information	advantage	held	by	one	party	is	
exploited	at	the	expense	of	the	lesser	informed	party.		This	conflict	is	protected	by	“collateral”	of	tangible	
assets.	From	this,	firms	that	have	more	tangible	assets	are	seen	to	have	a	higher	level	of	debt.	The	positive	
relationship	between	tangibility	and	total	debt	is	empirically	supported	by	Rajan	&	Zingales	(1995).		
	
4.3.5	Uniqueness	of	Assets	
The	uniqueness	of	assets	(UOA)	is	calculated	as	the	ratio	of	operating	expenses	to	total	sales.	The	
binding	effect	of	a	uniqueness	of	assets	is	suggested	in	Titman	and	Wessels	(1988)	study.	Limitations	that	
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the	firm	and	its	affiliates	face	results	in	a	high	cost	of	liquidation	and	consequently,	firms	have	a	lower	
debt	ratio.	So,	uniqueness	of	assets	is	expected	to	be	negatively	associated	to	the	debt	ratio.	
	
4.3.6	Non-Debt	Tax	Shield	
		 The	non-debt	tax	shield	(NDTS)	is	calculated	as	the	ratio	of	depreciation	to	total	assets.	Firms	
with	high	non-debt	tax	shields	often	have	less	debt.	A	firm	can	decrease	the	amount	of	corporate	taxes	
owed	by	using	depreciation	deductions	and	corporate	tax	credits	(DeAngelo,	and	Masulis,	1980).		
	
	
4.4	Endogeneity	Issues	
	 In	general,	endogeneity	occurs	in	a	regression	when	the	independent	variable	and	the	error	term	
are	 correlated.	 This	 produces	 biased	 and	 inconsistent	 coefficient	 estimates	 from	 which	 no	 reliable	
conclusions	 can	 be	 drawn	 (Roberts	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 There	 are	 three	 sources	 of	 endogeneity	 –	 omitted	
variables,	simultaneity	and	measurement	error	and	we	discuss	the	implications	of	each	below.	
	
4.4.1	Omitted	Variables	and	Measurement	Error	
Omitted	variable	bias	is	the	result	of	leaving	important	variables	out	of	a	model	and	consequently	
over	or	under	estimating	the	effect	of	one	or	more	of	the	other	factors.	Often,	we	want	to	measure	a	
particular	attribute	but	have	no	way	to	do	so	or	there	are	multiple	proxies	that	can	be	used;	the	researcher	
must	choose	variables	that	are	most	appropriate	which	biases	interpretation.	Since	some	factors	are	not	
being	represented	as	an	explanatory	variable,	they	appear	in	the	error	term,	e.	If	the	omitted	variable	is	
correlated	with	the	explanatory	variable,	then	inferences	from	the	regression	are	unreliable	(Roberts	et	
al.,	2011).	
	It	 is	 reasonable	 to	 assume	 that	 there	 will	 be	 omitted	 variable	 bias	 with	 regards	 to	 leverage	
because	there	are	dimensions	of	 the	model	which	are	hard	to	quantify.	For	example,	 frictions	such	as	
information	 asymmetry	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 capital	 structure	 but	 are	 extremely	 difficult	 to	 observe,	
particularly	to	an	external	researcher.	We	are	also	aware	from	the	literature	review	that	bankruptcy	costs	
are	taken	into	consideration	when	determining	leverage	but	it	is	complicated	to	model	this	and	reliant	on	
firm	specific	probability	of	default	(Negash,	2001).	
Free	cash	flow	from	operating	activities	is	a	measure	we	wanted	to	include	since	it	 increases	a	
firms	borrowing	capacity,	from	this	perspective	the	relationship	would	be	positive.	On	the	other	hand,	the	
pecking	order	hypothesis	suggests	that	internally	generated	funds	should	be	the	first	source	of	financing	
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and	this	would	suggest	a	negative	relationship	between	leverage	and	free	cash	flow.	Consequently,	the	
impact	 is	 unclear.	 To	 ascertain	 free	 cash	 flow	 from	 operating	 activities,	 manual	 adjustments	 to	 the	
reported	financial	data	are	required	and	due	to	the	magnitude	of	observations	in	our	sample	this	was	not	
practically	plausible	to	do.	
		 These	are	 just	a	 few	examples	of	potential	omitted	variables	 in	our	model.	Another	 source	of	
endogeneity	 is	measurement	error	which	 is	 the	 result	of	any	discrepancy	between	a	proxy	used	 for	a	
variable	that	is	hard	to	quantify	and	the	true	variable	(Roberts	et	al.,	2011).	In	this	study,	it	is	quite	likely	
that	 there	 is	measurement	error	with	 regards	 to	 the	 competition	proxies.	According	 to	Roberts	 et	 al.	
(2011)	panel	data	can	offer	a	solution	to	the	heterogeneity	present	in	empirical	finance	and	fixed	effects	
remedy	 the	 endogeneity	 problem	 caused	 by	 omitted	 variables	 and	measurement	 error.	 According	 to	
Lemmon,	Roberts	&	Zender	(2008)	fixed	effects	make	an	important	difference	to	estimated	parameters	
of	 leverage	equations.	This	 study	utilizes	 fixed	effects	and	runs	 the	redundant	 fixed	effects	 (likelihood	
ratio)	test	to	confirm	that	they	are	necessary.		
	
4.4.2	Simultaneity		
Simultaneity	bias	occurs	when	the	dependent	variable	and	one	of	the	explanatory	variables	are	
determined	 in	 equilibrium	 and	 consequently	 it	 can	 be	 said	 that	 the	 dependent	 variable	 causes	 the	
explanatory	variable	and	vice	versa	(Roberts	et	al.,	2011).	Much	of	the	theory	on	capital	structure	and	
product	market	 position	 suggests	 there	may	 be	 reverse	 causality	 in	 our	model	 (Zingales,	 1998)	 -	 it	 is	
unclear	whether	leverage	is	determined	based	on	competition,	or	whether	competition	defines	leverage.	
To	address	potential	reverse	causality	between	leverage	and	competition,	we	can	lag	competition:		
	𝑙𝑒𝑣$% = 𝛼 + 𝜆% + 	𝜇$ + 	𝛽-𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓$% + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒$% + 𝛽6𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ$% + 𝛽;𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔$% + 𝛽>𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆$% + 𝛽C𝑈𝑂𝐴$%+ 𝛽G𝑋I%R- + 𝛽J𝑋I%R-2 + 𝛽K𝑋I%R-6 + 𝜀$%	
	
We	explore	these	results	in	the	next	section.		
	 	
      (4) 
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5.	RESULTS	AND	DISCUSSION	
	
In	 this	 chapter,	 the	 empirical	 results	 obtained	 from	 EViews	 are	 discussed	 as	 well	 as	 the	
econometric	 techniques	 employed.	We	 outline	 the	 descriptive	 statistics,	 correlation	 analysis,	
regression	findings	and	discuss	the	implications	with	regards	to	the	hypotheses.		
	
5.1	Descriptive	Statistics	
Table	 3	 includes	 the	 descriptive	 statistics	 for	 the	 overall	 sample	 and	 shows	 that	 leverage,	 on	
average,	 is	 approximately	 26%;	 this	 coincides	 with	 Rajan	 and	 Zingales	 (1995)	 who	 find	 that	 firms	 in	
developed	countries	are	not	highly	levered.	As	demonstrated	in	Table	1,	the	sample	was	also	broken	into	
eight	industries.	Table	4	includes	the	mean	by	industry	and	demonstrates	the	difference	of	product	market	
competition	between	industries.	After	comparing	the	overall	sample	to	each	industry	individually,	we	can	
see	that	Agriculture	takes	on	less	leverage	on	average	at	only	15%	and	Services,	at	33%,	has	the	highest	
leverage.	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	 see	 how	 the	 inventory	 based	 industries	 are	most	 hindered	 by	 taking	 on	
additional	debt	but	it	can	be	expected	as	they	are	more	likely	to	have	a	high	value-at-risk.		
Now	observing	the	measures	of	competition,	the	average	Boone	indicator	for	the	overall	sample	
is	0.19.	The	highest	BI	 is	observed	 in	 the	construction	 industry	at	0.86.	This	suggests	 that	 the	product	
market	 competition	 in	 this	 industry	 is	 much	 higher	 than	 for	 the	 overall	 market.	 In	 turn,	 HHI,	 which	
measures	market	concentration,	shows	that	Agriculture	has	the	highest	concentration	level	(0.38)	and	the	
lowest	debt	 to	equity	 ratio.	The	high	 level	of	concentration	 found	with	HHI	 translates	 into	Agriculture	
having	the	least	amount	of	competition.		
Our	conceptual	framework	built	a	hypothesis	around	the	assumption	that	there	is	a	difference	in	
capital	structure	and	product	market	competition	across	industries	and	as	such	we	want	to	test	whether	
there	is	a	relationship.	Table	4	shows	the	difference	across	industries	for	leverage,	BI,	and	HHI.		
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Table	3:	Descriptive	Statistics	
	 	Mean	 	Median	 	Maximum	 	Minimum	 	Std.	Dev.	 	Probability	 	 	Observations	
LEV	 0.2606	 0.1430	 102.6531	 0.0000	 1.1429	 0.0000	 	 38767	
PROF	 -0.7872	 -0.4525	 1.2592	 -289.8148	 2.6209	 0.0000	 	 38767	
SIZE	 6.3469	 6.5455	 13.0101	 -5.5215	 2.6536	 0.0000	 	 38767	
GROWTH	 0.3511	 0.0522	 3184.0000	 -0.9976	 18.1472	 0.0000	 	 34193	
TANG	 0.2953	 0.2001	 1.0000	 0.0000	 0.2638	 0.0000	 	 38767	
NDTS	 0.0458	 0.0357	 6.1713	 0.0000	 0.0665	 0.0000	 	 38767	
UOA	 1.4584	 0.8775	 2767.6670	 0.0481	 16.3565	 0.0000	 	 38767	
BI	 0.1855	 0.1890	 1.9984	 -0.0946	 0.1117	 0.0000	 	 38767	
HHI	 0.0229	 0.0115	 0.4218	 0.0084	 0.0319	 0.0000		 38767	
	
Table	4:	Mean	by	Industry	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
	 LEV	 PROF	 SIZE	 GROWTH	 TANG	 NDTS	 UOA	 BI	 HHI	
A	 0.1458	 -0.4735	 5.4478	 0.5102	 0.4043	 0.0324	 2.1135	 0.0822	 0.3815	
Co	 0.2798	 -1.1878	 0.1875	 6.7181	 0.1216	 0.0276	 1.0285	 0.8563	 0.0731	
Ma	 0.2429	 -0.8115	 0.1699	 6.0047	 0.2081	 0.0401	 1.8172	 0.2166	 0.0104	
Mi	 0.2695	 -0.3528	 1.0495	 6.8565	 0.6644	 0.0791	 1.8186	 0.0323	 0.0482	
R	 0.2448	 -1.2723	 1.4700	 6.6829	 0.3430	 0.0499	 0.9342	 0.0654	 0.0654	
S	 0.3259	 -0.7707	 0.3116	 5.5537	 0.1741	 0.0492	 1.3101	 0.1805	 0.0199	
T	 0.2420	 -0.4013	 0.2023	 7.9702	 0.5629	 0.0488	 0.8389	 0.1484	 0.0109	
W	 0.2207	 -2.0145	 0.2232	 6.2902	 0.1715	 0.0251	 1.0166	 0.2705	 0.0555	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
	
5.2	Correlation	
Table	5	presents	a	correlation	matrix	 for	 the	variables	used	 in	 the	study.	There	are	 significant	
correlations	between	leverage	and	the	independent	variables.	Interestingly,	both	profitability	and	size	are	
negatively	correlated	with	 leverage.	The	BI	&HHI	have	a	correlation	of	 -0.0081	suggesting	that	they’re	
almost	independently	determined.	As	such,	we	find	that	one	cannot	be	used	as	a	robustness	check	for	the	
other,	they	are	simply	two	measures	of	competition	and	concentration	respectively.		
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Table	5:	Correlation	Matrix	 		 		 		 		 		 		
	 LEV		 PROF	 SIZE		 GROWTH		 TANG		 NDTS		 UOA		 BI		 HHI	
LEV		 1.0000	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
PROF	 -0.1933***	1.0000	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SIZE		 -0.0862***	0.2120***	 1.0000	 	 	 	 	 	 	
GROWTH		 0.0119**	 -0.0090*	 -0.0213***	1.0000	 	 	 	 	 	
TANG		 0.0262***	 0.0807***	 0.2839***	 0.0094*	 1.0000	 	 	 	 	
NDTS		 0.1388***	 -0.3451***	 -0.0992***	0.0159**	 0.1916***	 1.0000	 	 	 	
UOA		 0.0558***	 -0.0887***	 -0.1092***	0.0016***	 -0.0284***	 0.0358***	 1.0000	 	 	
BI		 -0.0013	 -0.0548***	 -0.0773***	-0.0100*	 -0.2930***	 -0.1010***	 0.0027	 1.0000	 	
HHI	 -0.0053	 -0.0413***	 -0.0070	 0.0085	 0.0771***	 0.0136**	 -0.0081	 -0.0932***	 1.0000	
This	table	presents	the	correlation	between	the	variables	in	the	model.	The	variables	are	as	defined	in	
Table	2	and	explained	in	section	4.	The	sample	is	from	2007-2016	and	comprises	US	listed	firms.	BI	and	
HHI	are	alternative	measures	of	competition	and	do	not	enter	the	same	regression	simultaneously.		
*	 Significant	at	10%	
**	 Significant	at	5%	
***	 Significant	at	1%	
	
5.3	Regression	Findings		
5.3.1	Leverage-Competition	Relationship		
In	order	to	test	the	effect	of	competition	on	leverage,	this	study	uses	ordinary	least	squares	(OLS)	
regression.	In	Table	6	we	can	see	the	results	of	estimating	the	Eq.	1	regression	using	data	for	the	overall	
sample	from	2007	-	2016.	Models	1	and	2	are	linear	and	non-linear	models,	respectively,	that	use	the	BI	
to	measure	competition.	Models	3	and	4	are	 linear	and	non-linear	models	that	use	HHI	as	a	proxy	for	
concentration	(seen	as	the	inverse	of	competition).	The	results	of	the	Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey	test	indicate	
very	significant	heteroscedasticity	with	a	p-value	of	0.0000	so	White’s	(1980)	heteroscedasticity-robust-
standard	errors	are	used	to	control	for	this	(Petersen,	2009).	We	estimate	the	equations	using	panel	fixed	
effects	(FE)	models	in	the	period	and	cross-section	dimension.	The	Hausman	(1978)	specification	test	is	
employed	 to	 confirm	 the	 suitability	of	 FE	against	 the	 random	effects	model.	 Further,	we	perform	 the	
redundant	 fixed	 effects	 test	 and	 obtain	 a	 p-value	 of	 0.0000	 for	 cross-section,	 period,	 and	 cross-
section/period	combined	indicating	that	FE	is	required	in	both	dimensions.		
In	 Table	6,	 the	 linear	models	 show	 that	 there	 is	 a	positive	 relationship	between	 leverage	and	
competition	 when	measured	 by	 the	 BI	 and	 a	 significant	 negative	 relationship	 between	 leverage	 and	
concentration	when	measured	by	the	HHI;	the	inverse	results	are	intuitive.	These	relationships	are	in	line	
with	the	limited	liability	model	and	consistent	with	the	theory	on	agency	cost.	Next,	we	consider	the	non-
linear	 models.	 When	 a	 model	 includes	 a	 non-linear	 component,	 the	 coefficients	 are	 not	 directly	
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interpretable.	Instead,	we	are	interested	in	the	marginal	effect	-		the	slope	of	the	regression	with	respect	
to	 the	covariate,	 competition.	Essentially,	 the	marginal	effect	disseminates	 the	 rate	at	which	 leverage	
changes	 “at	a	given	point	 in	 covariate	 space,	with	 respect	 to	one	covariate	dimension	and	holding	all	
covariate	values	constant”	 (Leeper,	2017).	This	requires	a	partial	derivative	calculation	of	 the	 leverage	
equation	with	respect	to	competition:	
	 𝐿𝑒𝑣 = 	bG𝑥 + 	bJ𝑥2 + bK𝑥6	
	 𝜕𝐿𝑒𝑣𝜕𝑥 = 	bG + 	2bJ𝑥 + 3bK𝑥2	
	
We	can	then	substitute	any	value	of	X	(the	competition	variable)	into	Eq.	6	and	use	the	coefficient	
estimates	from	Table	6	to	find	the	marginal	effect.	We	select	the	mean	values	of	the	BI	and	the	HHI	from	
Table	3	which	are	0.1855	and	0.0229	respectively	and	calculate	the	marginal	effects	to	be	-0.0507	and	-
5.6540.	The	non-linear	models	both	predict	a	negative	effect	on	average.	In	Appendix	1	we	have	plotted	
the	marginal	 effect	using	 constant	 intervals	of	 competition	 to	diagrammatically	demonstrate	how	 the	
effect	changes	as	competition	increases.	We	can	see	in	Graph	1	that	the	marginal	effect	of	the	BI	using	a	
non-linear	model	is	negative	and	convex.	In	Graph	2	the	marginal	effect	of	the	HHI	is	negative	for	lower	
values	of	concentration,	and	as	it	 increases	the	effect	crosses	the	x-axis	and	becomes	positive	for	very	
high	levels	of	concentration.		
We	must	now	consider	whether	the	non-linear	model	is	significant.	When	estimating	non-linear	
models	we	conduct	a	Wald	test	(Engle,	1984)	which	is	used	to	test	the	joint	significance	of	a	subset	of	
coefficients,	namely	the	competition	variables.	The	results	of	the	test	are	in	Table	6;	there	is	not	a	jointly	
significant	relationship	when	the	BI	is	used,	but	the	HHI	is	jointly	significant	at	the	1%	level.	In	summary,	
the	results	of	the	HHI	are	consistent	with	previous	literature	using	concentration	index’s	(Krishnaswamy,	
Mangla	 &	 Rathinasamy,	 1992),	 predicting	 a	 positive	 (negative)	 relationship	 between	 competition	
(concentration).	
	 However,	having	conducted	these	regressions	for	the	overall	sample	we	realized	that	we	may	not	
be	able	to	draw	reliable	inferences	from	the	data	(although	statistically	sound)	due	to	the	macroeconomic	
event	that	took	place	within	our	sample	period	which	we	examine	in	the	next	section.		
	
	
	
      (5) 
      (6) 
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Table	6:	Leverage	and	Competition	in	the	US	–	Period	&	Firm	Fixed	Effects	
		 Boone	Indicator	 		 		 Herfindahl-Hirschman	Index	 		
	 Model	1	 	 Model	2	 	 Model	3	 	 Model	4	 	
		 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	
C	 0.6489***	 0.1377	 0.6647***	 0.1383	 0.6866***	 0.1432	 0.7908***	 0.1604	
PROF	 -0.0416	 0.0395	 -0.0417	 0.0395	 -0.0416	 0.0395	 -0.0416	 0.0394	
GROWTH	 -0.0001	 0.0008	 -0.0001	 0.0008	 -0.0001	 0.0008	 -0.0001	 0.0008	
SIZE	 -0.0939***	 0.0223	 -0.0939***	 0.0223	 -0.0944***	 0.0224	 -0.0948***	 0.0224	
TANG	 0.5055**	 0.2106	 0.5079**	 0.2105	 0.5036**	 0.2107	 0.5053**	 0.2108	
NDTS	 0.3815	 0.8313	 0.3804	 0.8313	 0.3807	 0.8314	 0.3812	 0.8311	
UOA	 -0.0002	 0.0042	 -0.0002	 0.0042	 -0.0002	 0.0042	 -0.0002	 0.0042	
X	 0.0654	 0.0864	 0.0149	 0.1407	 -0.9421**	 0.3804	 -9.6206***	 3.0254	
X2	 	 	 -0.2169	 0.3132	 	 	 91.2793***	 31.4303	
X3	 	 	 0.1441	 0.1514	 	 	 -136.06***	 47.4124	
Wald	 	 	 0.7969	 	 	 	 4.4221***	 	
Adj	R2	 0.5641	 		 0.5642	 		 0.5641	 		 0.5642	 		
This	table	shows	the	estimation	results	for	Eq.	1	with	Lev	as	the	dependent	variable,	see	table	2	for	list	of	
independent	variables,	the	BI	is	the	beta	coefficient	from	Eq.	2	multiplied	by	-1	so	that	higher	values	reflect	
higher	competition,	the	HHI	is	determined	from	Eq.	3.	The	sample	period	is	2006	–	2016	using	US	listed	firms.	
Model	1	and	3	are	the	linear	regressions	for	the	two	competition	indices,	models	2	and	4	are	the	non-linear	
regressions.		The	regressions	are	run	using	period	and	cross-section	fixed	effects.	Standard	errors	robust	to	
heteroscedasticity	(white	diagonal)	are	shown.	Wald	tests	the	joint	significance	of	the	competition	variables.		
*	 Significant	at	10%	
**	 Significant	at	5%	
***	 Significant	at	1%	
	
5.3.2	Leverage-Competition	Relationship	Pre/During	and	Post-Crisis	
The	2008	global	financial	crisis	(GFC)	shocked	the	economy	and	severely	affected	the	US	capital	
market	(Gokay,	2009).	To	explore	the	impact	that	it	had	on	capital	structure,	we	split	the	sample	into	two	
sub-periods:	2006	–	2011	which	is	pre/during	the	crisis	(table	8)	and	2012	–	2016	which	is	post-crisis	(table	
9).	When	we	 split	 the	 sample,	none	of	 the	non-linear	models	 are	 jointly	 significant	per	 the	Wald	 test	
indicating	that	the	relationship	is	linear,	in	align	with	Hypothesis	3.	Interestingly,	the	BI	is	significant	and	
negative	in	the	post-crisis	linear	model	but	not	significant	during	the	crisis.	This	can	be	interpreted	in	two	
ways:	1.	The	BI	does	not	work	in	periods	of	financial	distress	because	it	is	calculated	using	financial	data	
which	 is	distorted	during	a	crisis	2.	The	BI	does	work	but	competition	 is	not	significant	 in	determining	
leverage	during	periods	of	uncertainty.	It	is	important	to	note	that	period	and	cross-section	fixed	effects	
were	used	which	reduces	variation	in	the	explanatory	variables	and	hence	the	probability	of	finding	an	
effect,	given	that	it	exists.	Therefore,	the	fact	that	the	regression	found	a	significant	effect	of	competition	
as	measured	by	 the	BI	 on	 leverage	means	 that	 the	 relationship	 is	 very	 strong.	 The	 negative	 effect	 of	
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competition	on	leverage	is	consistent	with	the	theoretical	predation	and	asset	substitution	models	and	
supports	hypothesis	2.					
	
Table	7:	Leverage	and	Competition	in	the	US	–	Sub	Period	1	
		 Boone	Indicator	 		 		 Herfindahl-Hirschman	Index	 		
	 Model	1	 	 Model	2	 	 Model	3	 	 Model	4	 	
		 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	
C	 1.0975***	 0.3875	 1.0946***	 0.3886	 1.1445***	 0.3993	 1.3418***	 0.4265	
PROF	 -0.1158	 0.0783	 -0.1158	 0.0783	 -0.1162	 0.0785	 -0.1163	 0.0784	
GROWTH	 -0.0019	 0.0018	 -0.0020	 0.0018	 -0.0020	 0.0018	 -0.0020	 0.0018	
SIZE	 -0.1650***	 0.0588	 -0.1650***	 0.0588	 -0.1661***	 0.0592	 -0.1643***	 0.0589	
TANG	 0.1555	 0.1340	 0.1578	 0.1334	 0.1512	 0.1341	 0.1616	 0.1315	
NDTS	 -0.3773	 0.3746	 -0.3779	 0.3737	 -0.3731	 0.3781	 -0.3755	 0.3770	
UOA	 0.0083	 0.0132	 0.0083	 0.0132	 0.0083	 0.0132	 0.0083	 0.0132	
X	 0.2612	 0.2105	 0.3940	 0.2542	 0.4897	 1.6988	 -14.7803**	 7.5012	
X2	 	 	 -0.6004	 0.6427	 	 	 140.0278	 86.8890	
X3	 	 	 0.2617	 0.2785	 	 	 -205.4946	 131.0433	
Wald	 	 	 1.4449	 	 	 	 2.2240*	 	
Adj	R2	 0.7663	 		 0.7664	 		 0.7657	 		 0.7659	 		
This	table	shows	the	estimation	results	for	Eq.	1	with	Lev	as	the	dependent	variable,	see	table	2	for	list	of	
independent	variables,	the	BI	is	the	beta	coefficient	from	Eq.	2	multiplied	by	-1	so	that	higher	values	reflect	
higher	competition,	the	HHI	is	determined	from	Eq.	3.	The	sample	period	is	2006	–	2011	using	US	listed	firms.	
Model	1	and	3	are	the	linear	regressions	for	the	two	competition	indices,	models	2	and	4	are	the	non-linear	
regressions.	The	regression	is	run	using	period	and	cross-section	fixed	effects.	Standard	errors	robust	to	
heteroscedasticity	(white	diagonal)	are	shown.	Wald	tests	the	joint	significance	of	the	competition	variables.	
*	 Significant	at	10%	
**	 Significant	at	5%	
***	 Significant	at	1%	
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Table		8:	Leverage	and	Competition	in	the	US	–	Sub	Period	2	
		 Boone	Indicator	 		 		 Herfindahl-Hirschman	Index	 		
	 Model	1	 	 Model	2	 	 Model	3	 	 Model	4	 	
		 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	
C	 0.8533***	 0.1707	 0.8520***	 0.1698	 0.8418***	 0.1722	 0.9089***	 0.1816	
PROF	 -0.0149	 0.0294	 -0.0149	 0.0294	 -0.0149	 0.0294	 -0.0148	 0.0294	
GROWTH	-0.0004	 0.0007	 -0.0004	 0.0007	 -0.0004	 0.0007	 -0.0004	 0.0007	
SIZE	 -0.1074***	 0.0291	 -0.1075***	 0.0291	 -0.1070***	 0.0291	 -0.1072***	 0.0291	
TANG	 0.3253	 0.2309	 0.3263	 0.2310	 0.3233	 0.2310	 0.3271	 0.2311	
NDTS	 0.9643	 1.0260	 0.9646	 1.0262	 0.9663	 1.0263	 0.9709	 1.0267	
UOA	 -0.0075**	 0.0033	 -0.0075**	 0.0033	 -0.0075**	 0.0033	 -0.0075**	 0.0033	
X	 -0.1195*	 0.0671	 -0.0552	 0.2321	 -0.5574	 0.4782	 -6.2442	 3.8547	
X2	 	 	 -0.3613	 0.5528	 	 	 57.7613	 36.0923	
X3	 	 	 0.3855	 0.3736	 	 	 -87.6710	 54.8944	
	 	 	 1.7772	 	 	 	 0.8809	 	
Adj	R2	 0.6901	 		 0.6901	 		 0.6901	 		 0.6901	 		
This	table	shows	the	estimation	results	for	Eq.	1	with	Lev	as	the	dependent	variable,	see	table	2	for	list	of	
independent	variables,	the	BI	is	the	beta	coefficient	from	Eq.	2	multiplied	by	-1	so	that	higher	values	reflect	higher	
competition,	the	HHI	is	determined	from	Eq.	3.	The	sample	period	is	2012	–	2016	using	US	listed	firms.	Model	1	
and	3	are	the	linear	regressions	for	the	two	competition	indices,	models	2	and	4	are	the	non-linear	regressions.	
The	regression	is	run	using	period	and	cross-section	fixed	effects.	Standard	errors	robust	to	heteroscedasticity	
(white	diagonal)	are	shown.	Wald	tests	the	joint	significance	of	the	competition	variables.	
*	 Significant	at	10%	
**	 Significant	at	5%	
***	 Significant	at	1%	
	
5.3.3	Leverage-Competition	Reverse	Causality	
When	 formulating	 the	main	 empirical	model	 Eq.	 1,	 we	 did	 not	 lag	 the	 competition	 variables	
because	the	data	frequency	is	annual.	If	the	observations	were	more	frequent	it	is	possible	that	a	change	
in	competition	in	one	period	would	not	have	an	effect	on	the	debt	ratio	until	the	next	period.	However,	
due	 to	 the	aforementioned	a	 concern	about	potential	 reverse	 causality	whereby	 leverage	determines	
competition	as	discussed	in	the	methodology,	a	solution	to	this	is	to	lag	the	competition	variables.	
The	results	of	estimating	Eq.	4	can	be	found	in	Appendix	2.	Although	this	is	not	the	primary	model	
used	in	this	paper,	we	are	including	them	for	completeness.	In	these	results	only	the	HHI	is	significant	in	
determining	leverage	in	Table	10,	model	2.	This	means	that	the	relationship	between	the	BI	and	leverage	
is	not	significant	when	lagging	annual	data.		
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5.4	Discussion	
Following	the	results	of	the	regressions,	the	implications	will	now	be	discussed	in	reference	to	the	
hypotheses.	The	purpose	of	 this	 study	 is	based	on	 the	notion	 that	concentration	 is	not	necessarily	an	
accurate	reflection	of	 inverse	competition	which	is	why	we	introduced	a	new	measure,	the	BI.	Using	a	
measure	of	concentration	as	a	proxy	for	competition	is	referred	to	as	a	structural	approach	whereas	the	
non-structural	 approach	 ascertains	 competition	 directly	 from	 market	 behaviour.	 An	 issue	 with	 the	
structural	approach	is	that	high	concentration	does	not	automatically	imply	low	competition.	According	
to	Demsetz	&	Lehn	(1985)	high	concentration	could	easily	be	the	result	of	substantial	levels	of	efficiency	
or	as	Boone,	Griffith	&	Harrison	(2005)	argue	as	a	result	of	inefficient	firms	exiting	the	market	when	there	
is	a	hike	in	competition.	From	this	perspective,	the	concentration	level	does	not	necessarily	translate	into	
a	degree	of	competition.	On	the	other	hand,	the	BI	captures	the	sensitivity	of	profits	in	relation	to	their	
inefficiency	in	the	market.	Thus,	with	this	measure	of	sensitivity	the	BI	is	not	skewed	by	inefficient	firms	
exiting	the	market	due	to	increased	competition	making	it	a	more	theoretically	appealing	measure.				
With	that	being	said,	the	significance	of	the	models	proxied	by	the	HHI	in	the	initial	overall	sample	
demonstrate	 a	 relationship	 between	 concentration	 and	 leverage	 (as	 seen	 in	 Table	 6)	 but	 do	 not	
necessarily	infer	that	a	relationship	exists	between	competition	and	leverage.	Furthermore,	due	to	the	
extreme	 financial	 turmoil	 experienced	 in	 the	 US	 within	 the	 10-year	 sample	 period	 the	 results	 are	
unreliable.		
In	an	effort	to	account	for	the	macroeconomic	circumstances,	the	regression	is	estimated	using	
two	sub-periods.	We	hope	that	sub-period	1	captured	the	vast	majority	of	the	volatility	caused	by	the	
crisis	and	analysis	of	sub-period	2	more	accurately	reflects	‘normal’	economic	conditions.	Sub-period	2	
yielded	a	significant	negative	relationship	between	leverage	and	competition	measured	by	the	linear	BI	
model.		We	argue	the	implication	of	this	finding	with	regards	to	the	hypotheses:		
	
1. There	is	a	significant	relationship	between	leverage	and	competition	across	US	listed	firms.		
2. The	relationship	between	leverage	and	competition	in	US	listed	firms	is	negative.	
3. The	relationship	between	leverage	and	competition	in	US	listed	firms	is	linear.		
	
From	a	theoretical	perspective,	the	findings	of	this	paper	support	the	predation	model.	As	such	if	
a	 firm	 is	 in	 a	 competitive	 industry	 and	 is	 trying	 to	 use	 high	 levels	 of	 debt,	 for	 example	 to	 curb	 the	
managerial	agency	problem	or	increase	barriers	to	entry,	they	should	be	aware	of	their	susceptibility	to	
rivals	with	‘deep	pockets.’		 	
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6.	CONCLUSION	
	
Using	unbalanced	panel	data	from	4,957	US	listed	firms,	the	effect	of	competition	on	leverage	is	
investigated.	We	use	a	new	measure	of	competition,	the	Boone	Indicator,	to	overcome	issues	associated	
with	using	a	concentration	proxy	as	done	in	previous	studies.	The	central	idea	of	this	study	is	to	determine	
whether	product	market	competition	affects	capital	structure,	and	if	so,	what	is	the	direction	and	nature	
of	 the	 relationship.	Based	on	 the	 literature,	 the	 limited	 liability	model	 predicts	 a	 positive	 relationship	
whereas	the	predation	and	asset	substitution	models	suggest	a	negative	relationship.		
In	order	to	empirically	model	the	determinants	of	capital	structure	this	study	uses	data	between	
2006-2016	from	eight	different	industries.	Respective	regressions	were	conducted	using	the	BI	and	HHI	
as	competition	variables	and	as	expected	resulted	in	inverse	results.	With	that	said,	the	HHI	was	deemed	
to	 be	 a	 dissatisfactory	 variable	 given	 concentration	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 competition	 can	 be	 distorted.	 To	
increase	the	reliability	of	the	results	found	with	the	BI,	the	sample	was	split	into	two	sub-periods.	In	doing	
so	we	accounted	for	the	distortion	to	financial	data	caused	by	the	2008	financial	crisis.	Here,	the	sample	
“post	crisis”	showed	a	significant	negative	relationship	between	competition	and	capital	structure.	From	
this,	our	research	supports	the	predation	model	and	as	such	firms	with	a	high	debt	to	equity	ratio	are	
vulnerable	 to	 predatory	 tactics	 by	 rivals	 who	 have	 intentions	 of	 driving	 their	 competition	 out	 of	 the	
market.			
Our	study	further	supports	the	BI	and	negates	the	validity	of	the	HHI	as	a	proxy	for	competition,	
however,	 the	 study	 had	 limitations	 that	 need	 to	 be	 addressed.	 For	 one,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 quantify	 an	
operational	formula	to	measure	a	relationship	given	there	are	numerous	qualitative	explanatory	variables	
and	factors,	such	as	bankruptcy,	which	require	complex	models	within	themselves.	The	study	also	allows	
for	future	research	built	on	the	fact	that	the	BI	was	not	significant	during	the	financial	crisis.	It	is	difficult	
to	study	leverage	during	an	intense	economic	downturn	since	we	do	not	know	whether	firms	are	making	
tactical	changes	to	their	capital	structure	or	if	their	borrowing	is	constrained	by	financial	institutions.	As	
such,	we	suggest	using	 the	BI	 for	additional	 time	periods	of	 relative	normality	 to	check	and	see	 if	 the	
relationship	 is	 still	 significant.	 Additional	 research	 could	 recreate	 a	 similar	 study	 using	 the	 BI	 but	 for	
different	and	or	developing	countries	in	order	to	assess	whether	competition	is	a	determinant	of	leverage	
in	alternative	markets.	Furthermore,	it	would	be	interesting	to	consider	the	relationship	in	reverse	and	
create	a	model	for	competition	with	respect	to	leverage.	From	this	angle	it	can	be	empirically	ascertained	
whether	firms	have	the	ability	to	strategically	alter	debt	and	influence	competitive	position.		
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APPENDIX	
Appendix	1	-		Marginal	Effect	of	Competition	on	Leverage		
Table	9:	The	Marginal	Effect	of	Competition	on	Leverage,	Using	Sample	Values	of	the	BI	
x	
Marginal	
Effect3	
0.05	 -0.00570925	
0.1	 -0.024157	
0.15	 -0.04044325	
0.2	 -0.054568	
0.25	 -0.06653125	
0.3	 -0.076333	
0.35	 -0.08397325	
0.4	 -0.089452	
0.45	 -0.09276925	
0.5	 -0.093925	
0.55	 -0.09291925	
0.6	 -0.089752	
0.65	 -0.08442325	
0.7	 -0.076933	
0.75	 -0.06728125	
0.8	 -0.055468	
0.85	 -0.04149325	
	
Figure	1:	Marginal	Effect	of	Competition	(BI)	on	Leverage	
	
	
                                                
3	Calculated	from	Eq.	6,	using	coefficient	estimates	from	Table	6,	Model	2	
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Table	10:	The	Marginal	Effect	of	Competition	on	Leverage,	Using	Sample	Values	of	the	HHI		
x	
Marginal	
Effect	
0.01	 -7.835832	
0.02	 -6.1327	
0.03	 -4.511204	
0.04	 -2.971344	
0.05	 -1.51312	
0.06	 -0.136532	
0.07	 1.15842	
0.08	 2.371736	
0.09	 3.503416	
0.1	 4.55346	
	
Figure	2:	Marginal	Effect	of	Competition	(HHI)	on	Leverage		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
Competition	(HHI)
		33	
Appendix	2	-	Regression	Results	for	Lagged	Competition	Variables	
Table	11:	Leverage	and	Competition	in	the	US	–	Lagged	Competition	
		 Boone	Indicator	 		 		 Herfindahl-Hirschman	Index	 		
	 Model	1	 	 Model	2	 	 Model	3	 	 Model	4	 	
		 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	
C	 0.6597***	 0.1394	 0.6597***	 0.1403	 0.7111***	 0.1457	 0.7737***	 0.1606	
PROF	 -0.0415	 0.0395	 -0.0415	 0.0395	 -0.0415	 0.0395	 -0.0415	 0.0395	
GROWTH	 -0.0001	 0.0008	 -0.0001	 0.0008	 -0.0001	 0.0008	 0.0000	 0.0008	
SIZE	 -0.0964***	 0.0228	 -0.0962***	 0.0227	 -0.0973***	 0.0228	 -0.0975***	 0.0228	
TANG	 0.5173**	 0.2145	 0.5173**	 0.2145	 0.5128**	 0.2145	 0.5148**	 0.2147	
NDTS	 0.3820	 0.8360	 0.3815	 0.8361	 0.3788	 0.8358	 0.3767	 0.8364	
UOA	 -0.0003	 0.0042	 -0.0002	 0.0042	 -0.0003	 0.0042	 -0.0003	 0.0042	
X	 0.0673	 0.0575	 -0.0070	 0.2329	 -1.2735***	 0.3978	 -6.3478**	 2.8213	
X2	 	 	 0.3906	 0.5165	 	 	 52.0480*	 28.4409	
X3	 	 	 -0.1881	 0.2101	 	 	 -76.5972*	 42.6108	
Wald	 	 	 1.1267	 	 	 	 4.4465***	 	
Adj	R2	 0.5614	 	 0.5615	 	 0.5614	 	 0.5615	 	
This	table	shows	the	estimation	results	for	Eq.	4	with	Lev	as	the	dependent	variable,	see	table	2	for	list	of	
independent	variables,	the	BI	is	the	beta	coefficient	from	Eq.	2	multiplied	by	-1	so	that	higher	values	reflect	higher	
competition,	the	HHI	is	determined	from	Eq.	3.	The	sample	period	is	2007	–	2016	using	US	listed	firms.	Model	1	
and	3	are	the	linear	regressions	for	the	two	competition	indices,	models	2	and	4	are	the	non-linear	regressions.		
The	regressions	are	run	using	period	and	cross-section	fixed	effects.	Standard	errors	robust	to	heteroscedasticity	
(white	diagonal)	are	shown.	Wald	tests	the	joint	significance	of	the	competition	variables.		
*	 Significant	at	10%	
**	 Significant	at	5%	
***	 Significant	at	1%	 	
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Table	12:	Leverage	and	Competition	in	the	US	–	Lagged	Competition	(Sub	Period	1)	
		 Boone	Indicator	 		 		 Herfindahl-Hirschman	Index	 		
	 Model	1	 	 Model	2	 	 Model	3	 	 Model	4	 	
		 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	
C	 1.2424***	 0.4193	 1.2854***	 0.4222	 1.2681***	 0.4331	 1.2103***	 0.4357	
PROF	 -0.1162	 0.0816	 -0.1158	 0.0815	 -0.1161	 0.0816	 -0.1161	 0.0816	
GROWTH	 -0.0019	 0.0017	 -0.0019	 0.0018	 -0.0019	 0.0017	 -0.0019	 0.0017	
SIZE	 -0.1794***	 0.0631	 -0.1786***	 0.0626	 -0.1798***	 0.0633	 -0.1804***	 0.0634	
TANG	 0.1467	 0.1469	 0.1491	 0.1468	 0.1457	 0.1472	 0.1416	 0.1478	
NDTS	 -0.3658	 0.3812	 -0.3675	 0.3786	 -0.3650	 0.3813	 -0.3651	 0.3811	
UOA	 0.0083	 0.0134	 0.0083	 0.0134	 0.0083	 0.0134	 0.0083	 0.0134	
X	 0.0052	 0.0855	 -0.5371	 0.4371	 -0.8745	 1.2759	 3.7381	 6.4038	
X2	 	 	 1.3986	 1.2159	 	 	 -44.1093	 64.2502	
X3	 	 	 -0.5577	 0.4909	 	 	 67.2612	 96.0017	
Wald	 	 	 1.7437	 	 	 	 0.4012	 	
Adj	R2	 0.7610	 		 0.7615	 		 0.7610	 		 0.0492	 		
This	table	shows	the	estimation	results	for	Eq.	1	with	Lev	as	the	dependent	variable,	see	table	2	for	list	of	
independent	variables,	the	BI	is	the	beta	coefficient	from	Eq.	2	multiplied	by	-1	so	that	higher	values	reflect	higher	
competition,	the	HHI	is	determined	from	Eq.	3.	The	sample	period	is	2007	–	2011	using	US	listed	firms.	Model	1	
and	3	are	the	linear	regressions	for	the	two	competition	indices,	models	2	and	4	are	the	non-linear	regressions.	
The	regression	is	run	using	period	and	cross-section	fixed	effects.	Standard	errors	robust	to	heteroscedasticity	
(white	diagonal)	are	shown.	Wald	tests	the	joint	significance	of	the	competition	variables.	
*	 Significant	at	10%	
**	 Significant	at	5%	
***	 Significant	at	1%	
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Table	13:	Leverage	and	Competition	in	the	US	–	Lagged	Competition	(Sub	Period	2)	
		 Boone	Indicator	 		 		 Herfindahl-Hirschman	Index	 		
	 Model	1	 	 Model	2	 	 Model	3	 	 Model	4	 	
		 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	Coefficient	Std	Errors	 Coefficient	 Std	Errors	Coefficient	 Std	Errors	
C	 0.7961***	 0.1623	 0.7840***	 0.1582	 0.8402	 0.1709	 0.8700	 0.1717	
PROF	 -0.0150	 0.0294	 -0.0150	 0.0294	 -0.0149	 0.0294	 -0.0149	 0.0294	
GROWTH	 -0.0004	 0.0007	 -0.0004	 0.0007	 -0.0003	 0.0007	 -0.0003	 0.0007	
SIZE	 -0.1062***	0.0288	 -0.1062***	0.0287	 -0.1070	 0.0291	 -0.1072	 0.0290	
TANG	 0.3222	 0.2310	 0.3227	 0.2307	 0.3222	 0.2311	 0.3231	 0.2310	
NDTS	 0.9658	 1.0255	 0.9664	 1.0260	 0.9637	 1.0261	 0.9627	 1.0261	
UOA	 -0.0075**	 0.0033	 -0.0075**	 0.0033	 -0.0075	 0.0033	 -0.0075	 0.0033	
X	 0.1584	 0.1156	 0.2087	 0.3330	 -0.4422	 0.4486	 -2.9477	 3.4038	
X2	 	 	 0.1495	 0.5758	 	 	 27.0861	 35.1916	
X3	 	 	 -0.2699	 0.3235	 	 	 -41.9674	 55.3842	
Adjusted	R2	 0.6901	 		 0.6901	 		 0.6901	 		 0.6900	 		
This	table	shows	the	estimation	results	for	Eq.	4	with	Lev	as	the	dependent	variable,	see	table	2	for	list	of	
independent	variables,	the	BI	is	the	beta	coefficient	from	Eq.	2	multiplied	by	-1	so	that	higher	values	reflect	higher	
competition,	the	HHI	is	determined	from	Eq.	3.	The	sample	period	is	2012	–	2016	using	US	listed	firms.	Model	1	
and	3	are	the	linear	regressions	for	the	two	competition	indices,	models	2	and	4	are	the	non-linear	regressions.	
The	regression	is	run	using	period	and	cross-section	fixed	effects.	Standard	errors	robust	to	heteroscedasticity	
(white	diagonal)	are	shown.	Wald	tests	the	joint	significance	of	the	competition	variables.	
*	 Significant	at	10%	
**	 Significant	at	5%	
***	 Significant	at	1%	
	
	
	
